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Introduction
Many studies have been written about the institutional constraints upon
Chilean democracy, and all of them have concluded that the constitutional
framework and the political context inherited from the military regime have
constrained the democratic government's ability to democratize the country.
As these studies have shown, the military's prerogatives are perhaps the
most obvious examples of these limitations.
Thus, when we ask about the causes for the maintenance of military autonomy
in Chile, the answer is usually to those military prerogatives. Most studies
stress the need to restore civilian control over military, that is, to achieve
the military subordination by changing these initial limitations in order
to permit the consolidation of democracy.
After seven years of formal democracy in Chile, we need to rethink this
approach for several reasons. First, this vision tends to be unidimensional,
because it only measures civil-military relations in terms of greater or
lesser prerogatives achieved by the armed forces. An analysis of the current
process of democratization needs to consider additional factors, such as
changes in the balance of power among the main actors of the political system.
The second weakness of this approach is that it tends to consider civil-military
relations in terms of two "poles" -- civilian vs. armed forces
-- without considering the existence of cleavages within the armed forces
and within civilian sectors. In the case of Chile, for instance, we need
to examine the existence of informal coalitions between some civilian political
sectors and some sectors of the military. The third criticism is related
to the concept of subordination. The normative approach emphasizes the need
to accomplish an objective subordination; that is, to change the law in
order to reduce military prerogatives and strengthen civilian prerogatives
over the armed forces. However, the mere existence of a law is not a guarantee
of the armed forces' subordination. The establishment of constitutional
laws that reinforce civilian control over the military is only a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for the subordination of military institutions.
Finally, this approach focuses on the reduction of the military prerogatives
but not on the behavior of civilian groups supporting these prerogatives.
The study of civilian perceptions of the armed forces' role in democracy
would help us to understand the types of coalitions that civilian and military
groups can make in specific circumstances.
Given these considerations, the analysis of civil-military relations in
Chile must consider not only the initial conditions of military prerogatives,
but also the preferences of the political elite. These preferences are expressed,
on the one hand, in the attitudes of elites about the role of the armed
forces in democracy, and on the other hand, in the interaction between the
armed forces and civilian actors in a democratic environment.
Preferences reflect actors' material interests. Preferences also reflect
power interests and, finally, preferences can show certain cultural values
that are dominant in specific groups of society. This paper examines not
only the military's prerogatives, but also elite perceptions about the functions
the armed forces should have in a democracy. These perceptions are expressed
in the elite's discourse and the decisional process by which the new democratic
authorities have dealt with the armed forces.
There are many ways to analyze preferences. In this case we are interested
in, first, analyzing how the armed forces and new democratic governments
create mechanisms for dialogue and interaction. I will argue these daily
processes of interaction have shaped contemporary civil-military relations
in Chile. In 1990, while the new civilian government stressed civilian authority
over the military, the armed forces stressed their autonomy from the government.
Since then, the way the government and the military have interacted have
transformed civil-military relations. The government has accepted the armed
forces as a "political actor," and the armed forces have accepted
some additional restraints. This evolving institutional framework has shaped
politics and strategies of political actors but, at the same time, actors
are in a constant process of "learning by doing." Thus, political
calculations and short-term decisions have also shaped civil-military relations,
generating informal mechanisms of conflict resolution.
In this process, two factors have become clear: first, some political parties
accept and defend the ideal of a "protected democracy," in which
the armed forces have a significant role in the political system. Second,
a characteristic of civil-military relations in the Chilean democracy has
been the generation of informal mechanisms to resolve central issues related
to the military autonomy.
The second way to analyze preferences is to focus on the level of elite
unity about the role of the armed forces. A unified elite that rejects military
intervention in politics may inhibit military intervention in politics,
while a fragmented elite may permit the creation of anti-democratic coalitions
between the armed forces and some sectors of civil society.
This essay begins with an analysis of the initial conditions of Chilean
democracy, emphasizing military autonomy and the principles of the transition.
That is followed by a discussion of civil-military relations during the
first seven years of democratic governments and an analysis of how these
governments have resolved civil-military conflicts.
I. The Armed Forces and Democracy: Initial Considerations
Historian Brian Loveman has explained the military intervention in politics
in Latin America through the ideology of "antipolitics"; that
is, the military's distaste of politics as something negative, chaotic,
unstable and corrupt. The ideology of antipolitics implies values of order,
obedience, authority and stability, all values inherited, he says, "from
Hispanic socioeconomic elites." These values have been supplemented
in this century by new elements, such as anticommunism, patriotism and nationalism
(Loveman, 1989: 5). The Cold War encouraged this view by providing the general
framework for the development of the national security doctrine in many
countries of Latin America. In particular, United States policy toward the
region emphasized the communist threat, and the armed forces throughout
Latin America promptly responded by shifting the focus of its military strategy
from external threat perceptions to internal threats of political instability,
poverty, and socialism.
The consolidation of democracy is not simply a problem of more or lesser
military prerogatives. In the case of Chile, the high level of military
prerogatives has focused the academic debate on the reduction of such privileges
(Hunter 1997, Linz and Stepan 1996). However, I argue that it is necessary
to analyze the three different dimensions of civil-military relations, and
the interaction among them. First, we need to analyze the initial conditions
of democracy, including normative considerations and the balance of power
among actors. Second, we have to analyze the political decisions that actors
have made in the daily process of democratization. Finally, we need to observe
the political system, considering in this case the level of elite unity.
II. Initial Conditions, Civil-Military Interactions, and Elites in Chile
On March 11, 1990, the new democratic government of Patricio Aylwin was
inaugurated. The new democratic framework was highly constrained, and the
armed forces maintained significant power resources and political influence.
To understand the transition we must examine the nation's political and
institutional circumstances: the political constraints refer to the principles
of the transition, while the institutional limits refer to prerogatives
that the armed forces retained.
Principles of the Transition.
The Chilean political transition began in 1987
when the principal parties opposing the dictatorship (Christian democrats,
Socialists, Radicals, and the Party for Democracy (PPD) agreed to participate
in a constitutionally mandated plebiscite in which people had to decide
whether Pinochet's government should continue for another eight years. Since
that time, the political discourse of the transition has been dominated
by some political "principles" that all actors have accepted,
including the military actors. These principles are basic ideas that served
as guidelines during the period of transition and later, during the establishment
of democracy. These political principles are:
Respect of the institutional framework. Although opposition parties
rejected the Constitution that was imposed in 1980 by the military dictatorship,
they accepted the framework it established. Therefore, the new democratic
government had to apply norms that it had rejected in its program. For instance,
Alywin's government did not agree to the constitutional provision that permitted
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces to remain in charge for eight
additional years, but democratic authorities had to accept this constraint
because it was part of the Constitution they swore to respect in 1990.
Governability-stability. The second principle refers to the objective
of a stable, peaceful transition to democracy. Political leaders knew that
citizens wanted a peaceful transition. Stability was (and still is) a central
goal in the first and second democratic governments. As we will see later,
the principle of stability often has been more important than other objectives
such as justice, accountability, or responsibility.
Consensus. The third essential principle is consensus. The main difference
between Chile before 1973 and after 1990 is that political parties were
conscious of the need to advance to democracy using consensual mechanisms
of conflict resolution. In the thinking of civilian actors, consensus will
prevent instability. However, consensus is a tricky word in Chile. On the
one hand, consensus was perceived by political actors as a useful tool to
achieve democracy. For instance, the main parties of the opposition agreed
to establish a coalition government (the ConcertaciÛn) based on a
consensual program among center and moderate leftist parties. In this case,
consensus implied abandoning ideological differences and building a common
platform. On the other hand, the strength of right-wing parties in Congress
and the existence of nine appointed senators have obliged the ruling ConcertaciÛn
to reach agreements with right-wing sectors in order to obtain approval
of proposals for political, economic, and social change. In this case, consensus
merely implies negotiation with the opposition. The right has the majority
in the Senate and forty-five percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies
and so any proposal for change could be blocked by the opposition.
These three concepts helped to define political behavior after 1990. As
we will see, the concept of stability has been central in civil-military
relations.
Military prerogatives
Three dimensions of military prerogatives were established in several laws
during the military regime.
Political autonomy: Political autonomy refers to the limitation of
civilian authorities in the following areas:
- The President cannot directly remove the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces. Before 1973, the President could remove any officer, including the
head of the armed forces. The 1980 Constitution permits the commander-in-chief
to stay in office for four years. The President can only remove him with
the approval of the National Security Council, in which the armed forces
hold half of the votes.
- The President cannot promote or remove officers of the armed forces without
the commander-in-chief's approval.
- The armed forces have a minimum budget established by constitutional law.
Additionally, the armed forces receive ten percent of the annual earning
from copper exports by the National Copper Corporation (Codelco). This special
budget can only be used for military acquisitions.
- The armed forces have special pension and health insurance systems.
Military justice has a high level of autonomy in relation to civilian courts.
All these prerogatives are defined by constitutional laws, making them difficult
to modify or even to discuss in Congress, given the opposition's majority
in the Senate. Both President Aylwin in 1993 and President Frei in 1995
sent bills to Congress in order to modify some aspects related to the promotion
and removal of officers. In both cases, the Senate refused to discuss this
issue.
There are two situations in which civilians have some options of "control"
over the military. The first situation is the President's veto power in
the promotion of military officers. President Aylwin rejected the promotion
of officers allegedly involved in human right violations. President Frei
recently used the same right in the case of an officer who worked in the
National Intelligence Service (DINA) between 1973 and 1978. The second situation
is related to the military's budget. The law specifies that the armed forces
must receive at least the same budget as in 1989, plus the yearly rate of
inflation. Democratic governments have given the military the exact budget
of 1989 (plus the yearly inflation rate) converting this minimum to a maximum.
Moreover, the economy has grown (in real terms) more than the yearly inflation.
Thus, the armed forces have received, in real terms, less money than in
1989, among other things, this affects directly the salary of officers.
Professional and doctrinaire autonomy: The second area of autonomy
refers to the high level of professional and doctrinal autonomy of the armed
forces. There is no civilian interference in the armed forces' training
programs. Since 1990, the armed forces have created their own programs,
have changed their logistical structure, and have developed a policy of
military weapons replacement with minimal civilian influence (Varas and
Fuentes, 1994).
Institutional involvement: Finally, the 1980 Constitution defined
the institutional involvement of the military, changing the traditional
role that the armed forces had before 1973. First, the 1980 Constitution
created the National Security Council (NSC) which advises the President
on national security issues. Moreover, this Council has the right to designate
four of the nine appointed senators every eight years. The NSC is composed
of the President, the President of the Senate, the President of the Supreme
Court, the national Contralor, and the three commanders-in-chief of the
armed forces and the director of the national police. In theory the NSC
should be the institution called upon to resolve civil-military conflicts.
However, its composition (half military and half civilians) and responsibilities
have created tension, rather than civil-military harmony.
The designation of appointed senators is another mechanism of institutional
involvement of the armed forces. The President directly designates two senators,
the Supreme Court selects three, and the NSC the other four. The latter
four must include only ex-commanders-in-chief, former directors of the national
police, or ex-under- commanders-in-chief. The original idea of the 1980
Constitution was to include "neutral members" in the Senate; however,
the current process of designating appointed senators has led to a high
degree of politicization.
The 1980 Constitution also mandates that an ex-President who governed more
than six years has the right to be appointed senator for life. General Pinochet
exercised this right last march, and he is the only one who fulfills this
condition.
In 1990, citizens did not know if these new institutions would work. The
armed forces had achieved a high level of autonomy and a high level of institutional
involvement in the political system. How did these constraints affect civil-military
relations? What was the reaction of the new democratic government to military
autonomy? How did the armed forces use their privileges? In the next section,
we explore these questions.
III. Civil-Military Interactions
"Learning by Doing"
The Aylwin administration began with a high level of uncertainty about civil-military
relations and engaged in a continuing process of "learning by doing."
While the armed forces had to adjust to the democratic game, the new government
had to accept the military autonomy established by the constitutional provisions
analyzed above. The agenda of civil-military issues included a set of more
obvious topics that always would be on the surface of the relationship such
as human rights, corruption, and transfer of armed forces properties to
civilian organizations. However, all these topics were embedded in a more
profound discussion about the subordination of the military to civilian
authorities.
The military not only wanted to maintain their privileges for practical
reasons, but also to demonstrate that they retained their autonomy and political
influence in the new institutional framework. On the other side, the new
civilian government believed it was important to demonstrate its supremacy
over the military. If the law did not permit that, the only option for the
government was to demonstrate its autonomy through specific gestures, norms
of protocol and symbols. For instance, the day of the inauguration ceremony,
President Aylwin refused to receive the symbol of presidential power (la
banda presidencial) directly from General Pinochet as the democratic tradition
specified. In the first military parade in the new era of democracy, the
officer in charge did not ask the President for authorization, breaking
the tradition of subordination to the President. Two months later, President
Aylwin used the right of veto to "freeze" this officer's career.
There are many examples of this game of power between the army and the government
during the first years of democracy. If the government did not have the
legal instruments to subordinate the armed forces, political symbols would
be used to show "who gives orders in this house." The struggle
for power among actors took place at different levels, including legal accusations,
legal initiatives, public pronouncements, challenges to norms of protocol,
and formal gestures made in special circumstances.
The second characteristic of civil-military relations at this time was the
different attitude assumed by the armed forces with the air force and the
navy adopting a non-belligerent attitude in comparison with the army. Two
circumstances contributed to create this situation: the lower level of involvement
of these institutions in the military regime, and the early change of the
commanders-in-chief in the navy (February, 1990) and the air force (July,
1991). In general, the navy and the air force resolved their conflicts with
the government through institutional mechanisms; that is, by consulting
the minister of defense.
In contrast, army-government relations went through two stages that coincide
with the two democratic governments. During the Aylwin administration (March
1990 - March 1994), army-government relations were focused on the problem
of human rights and the political dilemma of military subordination vs.
military autonomy. First, the government's objective was to uncover the
truth, and achieve the reconciliation of the country. One of the first measures
of Aylwin's administration was to create the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation
(Comisión Verdad y Reconciliación) to investigate human rights
violations committed between September 1973 and March 1990.
The Commission was composed of well-known persons; the idea was to establish
a pluralistic Commission in order to produce a consensual report. Moreover,
the Commission only examined specific human rights violations (those that
resulted in death) and did not have judicial responsibilities. The final
report, called the Rettig Report, was made public in March 1991, and it
included a register of more than two thousand missing persons and a recommendation
of moral and material reparation to the relatives of the victims. The impact
of this report was to reduce civil-military tensions, because after the
publication of the report the public's interest in this topic lowered, and
the reduction of public's interest affected the visibility of this issue
on the political agenda.
The second objective of the human rights' agenda of the government was justice,
but in this case there were no effective results. The main problem was the
existence of more than one thousand pending trials for the disappearance
of people between 1973 and 1978. In 1979, the military regime established
an amnesty law for all cases of human rights violations in this period.
However, judges could not apply this amnesty because another law explicitly
said that judges could close cases only when the body is found. This situation
generated the following paradox: cases remain open until the missing bodies
are found, but, if the body is found, the judge must immediately close the
case because of the amnesty law. Thus, the current legal framework inhibits
justice and keeps many cases open. Different actors have advocated distinct
solutions to this conflict. On the one hand, the military and the more conservative
right-wing sectors want to redefine the law in order to close all pending
cases. At the other extreme, leftist sectors and the association of missing
persons' relatives (Agrupación de familiares de detenidos-desaparecidos)
have demanded to find the bodies and to punish the guilty, that is, the
abolition of the amnesty law. Finally, as we will see later, the government
has tried to conciliate both positions without success.
The third objective of the human rights agenda was the reconciliation of
the country. The first part of the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation's
report suggests a "consensual" interpretation of the Chilean political
context in 1973. Nevertheless, one month after the Commission made public
this report, the armed forces individually expressed their own perspectives
of the Chilean breakdown of democracy.
The report of the Army was the most polemical because it directly rejected
"the wrong historical perspective of the Rettig Report" and noted
its "fundamental disagreement" over the report's concepts and
topics. Additionally, the army said that there were no reasons for anyone
to seek a pardon because the military action of 1973 was "a patriotic
mission" (Ejército, 1991). The last statement was a direct response
to President Aylwin, who had called to all responsible for the breakdown
of democracy in Chile to ask for pardon before the country. Thus, at least
two perspectives of the past remained irreconcilable.
The second stage in army-government relations began with the Frei administration
(March 1994 - 2000). First, the new government had the initial goal of reducing
the confrontation with the army by focusing the agenda upon professional
topics. The Concertación's program tended to stress defense policy
and the modernization of the armed forces, rather than human rights violations
(Program, 1994). In fact, the strategy of the Frei administration was to
postpone the discussion of institutional reforms (i.e., subordination of
the military) until the period 1998-2000 because of the composition of the
Senate. The second reason for this change was the designation of Edmundo
Pérez Yoma as minister of defense who, unlike the previous Minister,
Patricio Rojas, did not have a personal antipathy toward General Pinochet.
Despite this new approach, army-government conflicts did not decline. First,
leftist sectors of the government's coalition did not agree to postpone
the discussion of political and institutional reforms until the second half
of the government. From their perspective, the issue of the appointed Senators
was central in the process of democratization of the country. Second, in
1995 the Supreme Court sentenced one ex-general and one ex-colonel to jail
terms in one of the most salient cases of human rights violations in Chile.
This situation raised human rights as a priority in the political agenda
of 1995, and at the end of that year, human rights and the political discussion
of the institutional autonomy of the armed forces were still the two principal
aspects of congressional debates.
Human rights and democracy
The dilemma of pragmatism vs. ethical principles is always present in transitions
to democracy. Focusing on the case of human rights, Manuel A. Garretón
explains this situation as one of two intertwined logics. On the one hand,
there were the politico-statist logic "which basically centers upon
the conquest and maintenance of a democratic regime. Here, the issue of
human rights is subordinated to that of democracy, inasmuch as the central
concerns are the carrying out and consolidation of the transition from authoritarianism
to democracy." On the other hand, there was the ethical-symbolic logic,
"which proposes a radical solution suggesting the reconstitution of
the situation that existed prior to the massive violation of human rights"
(Garretón, 1996: 41). Political actors in Chile had to choose one
of these two. While the government opted for the politico-static logic,
human rights organizations and some leftist parties opted for the ethical-symbolic
logic.
There are three important preconditions that would help us to explain the
government's choice. First, the analysis of civil-military interactions
reveals the existence of moderate sectors that, breaking traditional ideological
patterns of hostility toward the armed forces, agreed to resolve civil-military
conflict pragmatically. The objective was to create a successful democracy,
and pragmatism was seen as an essential condition to achieve practical goals.
Second, this was an elitist method of conflict resolution. Few people knew
about the conflicts, the demands and the ways open to resolve each crisis.
Public opinion was unimportant in all these situations. Finally, the last
condition is the existence of an implicit or explicit civilian-support of
the military's demands. As we explained in the introduction, we cannot explain
civil-military relations as the interaction between two isolated sectors.
All major sectors accepted the military as an "special actor"
simply by accepting the Constitution, and this gave the military more confidence
to intervene in politics.
IV. Elite Perceptions of the Military
One of the most salient characteristics of the Chilean transition is the
elitism of the decision making process. Public opinion was absent during
the crises. Most citizens did not understand the nature and evolution of
civil-military conflicts. The elitist process of democratization raises
the question of how the Chilean elite perceives democracy and, specifically,
the military's role in democracy. Are elites agreed about military intervention
in politics? Are there ideological differences about the role that the military
should have in democracy?
There are only a few studies of these questions. In a recent work, Felipe
Aguero suggests some initial ideas about civilian-elite thinking of the
military. Focusing on political leaders, business people, union leaders,
and Church officials, he concludes that the main concern of the elite is
two aspects of the internal role of the armed forces: the armed forces as
a internal security power, and the military involvement's in the development
of the country. In the first case, Chilean elite opinions show, according
to Aguero, a deep cleavage between those who consider the military as an
independent security power, and those who believe that the military must
be subordinated to civilian authorities. There is also a division among
the elite in the second case, about the degree of involvement of the armed
forces in the development of the country. The various combinations of these
two cleavages (internal security power and involvement in development) leads
to four possible positions:
Authoritarian position. These actors defend the participation of
the armed forces as a "guarantor" of democracy, interpreting rigidly
the 1980 Constitution. They also defend current military prerogatives and
the institutional framework inherited from the military regime. Moreover,
these actors promote an active participation of the military in the development
of the country in non-military areas (education, health, protection of the
environment, etc.). Aguero argues that the main actors that defend this
position are the members of right-wing parties (Renovación Nacional
and Unión Demócrata Independiente) and business organizations.
Neoliberal Authoritarian position. A deviant case of the prior position
is the neoliberal authoritarian perspective. In this case, actors defend
the participation of the armed forces as an independent power, but without
an involvement in development issues. In this category are some liberal
right-wing sectors and business people.
Objective Subordination with participation in development. These
actors promote an objective subordination of the military and the involvement
of the military in the development of the country. Here Aguero distinguishes
two internal positions: some sectors accept the participation of the military
in the development of the country for pragmatic reasons, that is, because
the country has needs and the armed forces have capabilities to help in
the development, while other actors perceive the military's involvement
in the development as a constant ideal. The Concertación, the Chruch,
and labor leaders defend this position.
Objective subordination. A small sector defends the objective subordination
of the military, excluding its participation in development issues. Aguero
identifies the Communist party as holding this position.
Aguero's categorization raises important questions and requires further
clarification. For instance, what is the position of the liberal sector
of the right-wing party Renovación Nacional which supports some institutional
reforms in order to subordinate the armed forces? Moreover, we know little
about the type of democracy that business sectors support. Another question
is the presence of these positions among society. To what extent do citizens
support military intervention in politics? There are no answers to these
questions yet.
Although he recognizes that he has insufficient sources to evaluate elite
thinking about the military, Aguero suggests an interesting conclusion:
the cleavage between sectors that consider the military as a independent
power on the one hand, and those that desire the subordination of the military
on the other, remains the same as in the 1960s. Thus today's cleavages about
the internal role of the armed forces can be considered as a long-term tendency,
and then, "it is possible to predict the continuity of this deep cleavage
over time" (Aguero, 1997b). The effect of this fragmentation within
the elite is the reinforcement of the military's autonomy, because civilian
elites are divided and cannot offer a unified position in response.
Conclusion
The analysis of civil-military relations in Chile needs to be broadened.
Certainly we need to analyze the legal framework inherited from the military
regime, but the consideration of this element is not enough to understand
the armed forces' autonomy. The analysis of the behavior of the civil society
reveals two important features: first, the civilian elite in Chile is deeply
divided about the role of the armed forces in democracy. Second, the political
context of the transition has forced democratic authorities to accept the
military as a "special political actor." Thus, the new authorities
have created informal channels of conflict resolution in order to guarantee
stability and consensus, two central principles of the transition.
What is interesting in the case of Chile is the different approach that
two democratic governments that share the same ideology and face the same
institucional prerogatives of the military have acted differently in resolving
civil-military conflicts. While the Aylwin's administration insisted on
an objective subordination of the military (at least in the public discourse),
the Frey opted to reduce civil-military conflicts, creating a "civilian
leadership" over the military (subjective subordination).
It is too early to evaluate which strategy has been the better. For the
moment, we can say that neither the first nor the second strategy has had
concrete effects in changing the position of the armed forces in the constitutional
framework. Further research must be done in this topic. For instance, it
seems to be that the more pragmatical option of the second government has
reinforced civil society's demands for less military intervention in politics,
for justice, and the resolution of human rights problems. Another open question
is why conservative sectors are willing to support these military privileges.
Is this a question of legacy, power interests, culture or something else?
The recent events in relation to the arrest of the former dictator general
Augusto Pinochet in England have proven to be a transparent demonstion of
this paper's arguments. In Chile the case has opened an intense debate between
the options of justice vs. the defense of national sovereignty. On the one
hand, center and leftist sectors have supported the Spanish trial against
Pinochet-- based on the need to achieve justice. They argue that it is impossible
to achieve this goal in Chile itself. Moreover, they justify the Spanish
decision to prosecute Pinochet based on the consideration of human rights
as subject to the international law. On the other hand, right-wing parties
and the army have demanded a more aggressive policy in order to defend the
right of any individual to be prosecuted in his/her own country. The government
has attempted to maintain an equilibrium between these two contradictory
positions. The case has shown how Chile is historically divided in two segments.
Chile is still "a nation of enemies."
The current academic focuses on the consolidation
of democracy as a central topic in the third wave of democratization. Some
scholars have emphasized the need to create a "culture of citizenship"
(Jelin and Hershberg 1996), to strengthen political institutions in terms
of values and norms, and to encourage civil society as a crucial actor in
consolidating democracy (Diamond et al. 1997). In this paper, I have stressed
that another important topic in consolidating democracy is the political
definition of the roles of the armed forces. Consolidating democracy implies
achieving an extensive political agreement about the role of the armed forces
in democracy. Moreover, it implies a permanent political attitude that reduces
the military's intervention in politics and expands civilian supremacy over
the military.
References
Aguero, Felipe 1997. Brechas en la democratización. Visiones de
la elite politica sobre
las fuerzas armadas en Chile. Forthcoming, Nueva Serie FLACSO.
Diamond, Larry, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien eds. 1997.
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Baltimore and London. The
Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Ejército de Chile. 1991. Respuesta del Ejército de Chile
al Informe de la Comisión
Verdad y Reconciliación. Santiago, Chile.
Fuentes, Claudio 1996. El discurso militar en la transición chilena.
Santiago. Nueva
Serie FLACSO. Programa FLACSO and Duke-UNC Program in Latin American
Studies.
Fuentes, Claudio 1997. Militares en Chile: ni completa autonoma ni total
subordinación. In Chile 96. Análisis y opiniones.
Santiago. FLACSO-Chile.
Garretón, Manuel Antonio 1996. Human Rights and Democratization
Processes. In:
Constructing Democracies. (Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg eds.)
Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press.
Hunter, Wendy. Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against
Soldiers. The University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
Jelin, Elizabeth and Eric Hershberg eds. 1996. Constructing Democracies.
Boulder,
Colorado, Westview Press.
Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition
and
Consolidation. Baltimore and London. The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Loveman, Brian 1993. The Constitution of Tyranny. Pittsburgh and
London. The
University of Pittsburgh.
ISLA has edited this text from a longer
essay, a version of which was read at the 1998 LASA Congress. The author
can be reached at cfuentes@email.unc.edu
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