by Dr. Soraya M. Castro Mariño.
Centro de Estudios Sobre Estados Unidos
Universidad de la Habana

Editor's note:In this paper, Dr. Soraya Castro examines the highly conflictive relations between the U.S. and Cuba. She offers guidelines to understand the "irrational" policy that is stubbornly maintained by Washington in spite of international pleas for change. We have edited Dr. Castro's 33-page long paper to highlight her analysis of shifts in Cuban-American consensus, Clinton's luke-warm response to the Pope's visit and to increased freedom in Cuba, and the continued, though weakened, influence of the right-wing Cuban-American lobby in Washington.

The breakdown of the bipolar system of international relations disengaged Cuba from the East-West axis. Consequently, by 1989 perceptions about the island changed and for the first time since the Missile Crisis of 1962, most US officials recognized that Cuba was not a threat to U.S. national security.

Cuba has previously been perceived as a Soviet satellite. The United States government's main demands focused on the need for changes in Cuba's internationalist policy, particularly in Africa and Central America. In the course of those years, however, the question of Cuba was not a priority in U.S. political circles and the policy was rather consensus-based: Democrats and Republican, liberals and conservatives generally assumed markedly anti-Cuban positions.

The new context offered excellent political opportunities to review the policy toward the Caribbean Island as the apparently most controversial issues in Cuba-U.S. agenda had been ironed out by history. 

However, it was the right wing of the Cuban-American Community that seized the moment and pursued strategies to tighten the blockade and to increase tension between Cuba and the U.S. It understood the situation as an ideal one to destroy the Cuban project and in consequence pushed Congress initiatives designed to make the system collapse.

At the same time, Republican President George Bush attached little strategic relevance to Cuba and, weighing its new relations with post-Soviet Russia, stayed in expectation of events without altering its policy toward Havana. The topic of democracy and human rights however was brought to the fore in the bilateral agenda.

In any case, the disappearance of the Soviet Union had a critical impact on Cuba. The island had to undertake an economic restructuring to be able to face internal challenges brought about by changes in international relations.

Facts then showed clearly that the dynamics of the policy-making process and the positions of different players did not always coincide. The Executive branch, interested in other strategic and security issues, did not pay attention to Cuba. Meanwhile a group of legislators, backed by the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF), the fiercest anti-Cuban lobby group, forced the debate on the Cuban problem. Moreover, they turned the issue into a domestic one by fictitiously linking the electoral vote in Florida and New Jersey with Cuba-U.S. relations.

The lack of an articulate, long term Executive strategy with respect to Cuba, stating future steps beyond circumstantial events, and the basic consensus on the need for the island to modify its political system, helped certain special interest groups monopolize the Cuban issue. They used the United States' political process and the congressional electoral logic to serve their own interests.

The difficult economic pressure the island was going through was compounded by its relatively declining weight in the System of International Relations. These were the background of an initiative that, instead of fostering a policy change in tune with the end of the Cold War, drove the U.S. Congress to intensify pressure to make the Cuban project collapse in the short term.
Common objectives and the electoral logic led the Bush Administration to back such legislative measure, although it considered it wise to leave some room for maneuver as regards substantive elements that could be perceived as a threat to U.S. national security posed by Cuba.

The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, also know as Torricelli Act, was therefore designed to intensify the economic blockade and bring more pressure to bear on the Island. Eventually, it became the formula to force the debate on Cuba in electoral periods, as evidenced by the passing of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, commonly referred to as Helms-Burton Act.

US policy toward Cuba is irrational because it does not correspond to reality, i.e., the Cuban reality, the lack of a Cuban threat if it ever was one, and the inadequacy of the blockade to achieve newly stated goals of "bringing democracy" to Cuba. What explains such seeming irrationality?
 

The Pope's Visit

Though it is still very early to determine the lasting impact of Pope John Paul II's trip to Cuban domestic policy, we will analize some of the most important effects in U.S. - Cuban relations.

The Pope's visit underlines the failure of U.S policy toward the island. The Pope criticized the U.S. blockade during his January 21-25 1998 trip. "The Cuban people," he said, "cannot be denied the contacts with other peoples necessary for economic, social and cultural development...." His holiness called for "the world to open to Cuba, and for Cuba -- with all its "magnificent possibilities" -- to open to the world", but still the official U.S Policy is to isolate Cuba from the rest of the world. 

The Cuban Government and the Vatican believe Pope John Paul II's trip to Cuba has borne fruit. Rome is cautiously pushing ahead with its agenda to raise the profile of the Roman Catholic Church on the island. Cuba's release of some prisoners, the increasing role allowed Catholic humanitarian organizations and the Easter celebrations all are viewed as signs that the Vatican's policy is on track. 

Regional and International Support for Cuba

All of Latin America has condemned the U.S. policy towards Cuba. Likewise, U.S European allies refuse to go along and Canada goes out of its way to defeat U.S efforts to cut off all contact between Cuba and the outside world.

In the last Summit of the Americas in Chile the Cuban issue was very present. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien visited the island on April. Barbados -- in the name of the Caribbean region -- called for Cuba's complete reinsertion, and Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso described Cuba's presence as essential in order to speak of a unified American continent.

The Dominican Republic and Guatemala announced that they had reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba. Spain, meanwhile, named its ambassador to Havana in April, putting an end to a diplomatic crisis that broke out in 1996. And Mexico called in April 21 for Cuba to be re-admitted into the OAS. 
 

The Shift in Cuban-American Consensus

The balance of power in U.S. politics is begining to shift away from Cuban American hard-liners. There is an important U.S. trend: the erosion of conservative support for U.S. Cuba policy. The National Review, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Times all have editorialized against the current U.S. policy. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is lobbying aggressively in favor of sales of food and medicine to Cuba.

The decline of broad conservative support for the blockade leaves Miami's hard-liners almost alone in supporting this policy. Those hardliners are concerned as well about the gathering momentum of the forces in favor of a softening of the blockade, and they are concerned in the context of the vacuum of leadership left by the death of Jorge Mas Canosa in late 1997.

Meanwhile, Miami critics of the hard-line policy have become far more visible. About 200 Cuban Americans from the Miami area went to Washington in April, lobbying Congress to end the blockade on food and medicine.

A parallel process is taking place in Dade County. Since the 1994 Migration Agreement a new wave of Cubans are legally arriving in Miami. They left the island without any political resentment or social distress. Their concerns are more similar to other immigrants from the Third World, and for sure "fighting communism in Cuba" is not among their priorities. 

At the same time, 35% of the Cuban-Americans have not been born in the island. They belong to the so-called second and third generation of Cuban Americans and, as a group, they do not look at Cuba the same way their parents or grandparents used to. Miami's demography is changing radically, and that will impact the policy toward Cuba in the near future. 

The issue of U.S.-Cuban relations is being discussed in circles and by groups that have never been involved before. Growing numbers of mainstream corporate leaders, labor union officials, politicians and business associations have begun to take a stand against the trade ban. Nearly 700 companies, trade associations and farm organizations have joined USA Engage in a few years. Members and supporters include the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, Eastman Kodak, General Motors, Goodyear and Honeywell.

USA Engage is a new movement aimed at eliminating American economic sanctions against Cuba and other countries around the world. Some economists estimate U.S. trade with the island, if the ban is lifted, would jump to $3 billion per year initially then soar to $7 billion within a few years.

Washington Stands By its Emargo, In Spite of International Pleas 

For the first time since the introduction of the Helms-Burton Act, designed to starve Cuba of foreign investment and codify a 35-year-old trade blockade, U.S. efforts to isolate Havana have come under sustained attack.

Despite pleas from Pope John Paul II, humanitarian-aid groups, many members of Congress, Europeans, Canadians, Latin Americans, the United Nations and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, neither Congress nor President Clinton have been prepared to ease any portion of the policy. When Cuba responded to the pope's visit by allowing churches to flourish and agreeing to release scores of prisoners, Cuba watchers looked to the United States for a response.

Instead, two months after Pope John Paul II visited the island, On March 20, William Clinton announced the following measures:

First, the resumption of licensing direct humanitarian charter flights to Cuba. 
Second, establishing new licensing arrangements to permit Cuban Americans and Cuban families living here in the United States to send humanitarian remittances to their families in Cuba at the level of $300 per quarter, as was permitted until 1994.
Third, streamlining and expediting the issuance of licenses for the sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba. 

The steps the Administration has taken were really very modest. They simply restore humanitarian provisions that were in effect when Clinton took office but were later suspended in 1994 and in 1996. Again, it was underlined that the current U.S. nonpolicy toward Cuba does not have any rationale and only maintains the status quo. Opportunities to promote positive change have being wasted.

(...)

Incredibly, only 20 days after the so called new measures approved by the Administration it became known that the Defense Department concluded that Cuba poses no significant threat to U.S. national security, and senior defense officials increasingly favor engaging their island counterparts to reduce existing tensions.

Prepared in coordination with the Defense Intelligence Agency, the CIA, the National Security Agency, the National Security Council and the State Department, the assessment said that Cuba now poses "a negligible threat to the U.S. or surrounding countries". 

...And Yet, the Hardline Policy Prevails

This context gives an excellent opportunuty to review overall U.S. Policy toward Cuba, but to change that policy the President has to have a moral conviction, and unfortunately, Clinton's personal traits as President include an inconsistency in his position and radical change of opinion in tune with the prevailing political trend. So his best bet on the Cuban case is therefore that nothing should happen in the largest Antilles island to make him feel pressured to act one way or another.

At the same time, it seems that President Clinton is not interested in reviewing the Cuban question from another perspective as, in the cost-benefits analysis, he considers it will mean more costs than points scored in favor of his party and the future Democratic candidate for the 2000 election.

An evidence of the asymmetry in the relevance that each country attaches to the other in terms of policy making: While Cuba has always considered the United States claims when designing its national policy, the island is not, in the short or medium term, a political priority for the United States.

(...)

Another element that further complicates relations between the two countries is, undoubtedly, the existence of an articulate, anti-Cuban lobby with relative financial clout: The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). Despite, the death of its leader Jorge Mas Canosa, still the CANF has the ability of bearing fruits to sustain pressure within American political circles.

In Congress, the only vocal and influential institution is still the CANF, which lobbies the various congressional committees and subcommittees that discuss bills concerning U.S. policy's toward Cuba. The CAN-F has a bearing on the formulation of U.S.-Cuba relations.

All this, and the fact that three Cuban-Americans sit in Congress, and their goals as legislators are almost limited to the question of Cuba, constrained the debate on U.S. policy toward the island. As a result, the discussion used to be centered only on those who have very specific interests in that country.

Therefore, if we examine the deep roots of Cuba-U.S relations since the former became a Republic--characterized by the dichotomy Sovereignty vs. Domination--and if we added the above mentioned elements, highlighting the Foundation's activities and the markedly anti-Cuban stance of the three Cuban-American representatives, then it is easy to understand why the issue, without being a priority in U.S. foreign policy, is manipulated and monopolized by the right wing during the policy-making process.

There has been a shift in public opinion, but still "Old warriors die hard." Despite the evolution of public opinion in the United States within the business community, the Catholic Church, humanitarian groups, the leadership's vacuum in the CANF and the demographic changes in the Cuban community in Miami, time is needed still for these voices to translate into foreign policy changes.